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Abstract 
In this paper I describe the early development of the so-called mathematical biophysics, as conceived by Nicolas 
Rashevsky back in the 1920´s, as well as his latter idealization of a “relational biology”. I also underline that the 
creation of the journal “The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics” was instrumental in legitimating the efforts of 
Rashevsky and his students, and I finally argue that his pioneering efforts, while still largely unacknowledged, were 
vital for the development of important scientific contributions, most notably the McCulloch-Pitts model of neural 
networks.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The modern era of theoretical biology can be classified into “foundations,” “physics and 
chemistry,” “cybernetics” and “mathematical biophysics” (Morowitz, 1965). According to this 
author, an important part of the history of the modern era in theoretical biology dates back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, with the publication of D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson’s opus 
“On Growth and Form” (Thompson, 1917), closely followed by works like the “Elements of 
Physical Biology” of Alfred J. Lotka (1925). Some authors tracked Lotka’s ideas closely, 
yielding books such as “Leçons sur la Théorie Mathématique de la Lutte pour la Vie,” by Vito 
Volterra (1931), and Kostitzin’s “Biologie Mathématique” (Kostitzin, 1937). Mathematics and 
ecology do share a long coexistence, and mathematical ecology is currently one of the most 
developed areas of the theoretical sciences taken as a whole. Genetics is another example of 
great success in modern applied mathematics, its history beginning (at least) as early as in the 
second decade of the last century, when J. B. S. Haldane published “A Mathematical Theory of 
Natural and Artificial Selection” (Haldane, 1924), followed by “The Genetical Theory of Natural 
Selection,” in 1930, and “The Theory of Inbreeding,” in 1949, both by R. A. Fisher (see Fisher, 
1930, 1949). The approach of “physics and chemistry” is represented by workers like Erwin 
Schrödinger – one of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics –, who wrote a small but 
widely read book entitled “What is Life?” (Schrödinger, 1944), and Hinshelwood (1946), with 
his “The Chemical Kinetics of the Bacterial Cell.” “Cybernetics” is a successful term coined by 
Norbert Wiener and used in a book with the same name (Wiener, 1948). At the same time C. E. 
Shannon (1948) published his seminal paper “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” and 
it is a known fact that both works profoundly influenced a whole generation of mathematical 
biologists and other theoreticians. While Wiener stressed the importance of feedback – with the 
notion of closed loop control yielding new approaches to theoretical biology, ecology and the 
neurosciences –, information theory was improved and applied in several technological and 
scientific areas. Finally, the amalgamation of information theory with the notion of feedback 
strongly influenced the work of important theoretical ecologists like Robert E. Ulanowicz (1980, 
1997) and Howard T. Odum (1983).  
I suggest that the development of the last division highlighted above, namely “mathematical 
biophysics” is, up to now, largely unknown to mainstream historians and philosophers of 
science. Interestingly enough, this unfamiliarity spreads even to most historians and philosophers 
of biology. However, I wish to point out a recent revival of some fundamental ideas associated 
with this school, a fact that, alone, justifies a closer look into the origins of this investigative 
framework. Accordingly, in this paper I review and briefly discuss some early stages of this line 
of thought. 
 
 2. The roots of mathematical biophysics and of the relational approach 
 
Nicolas Rashevsky was born in Chernigov on September 1899 (Cull, 2007). He took a Ph.D. in 
theoretical physics very early in his life, and soon began publishing in quantum theory and 
relativity, among other topics. He immigrated to North America in 1927, after being trained in 
Russia as a mathematical physicist. His original work in biology began when he moved to the 
Research Laboratories of the Westinghouse Corporation in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where he 
worked on the thermodynamics of liquid droplets. There he found that these structures became 
unstable past a given critical size, spontaneously dividing into smaller droplets. Later still, while 
involved with the Mathematical Biology program of the University of Chicago, Rashevsky 
studied cell division and excitability phenomena. The Chicago group established “The Bulletin 
of Mathematical Biophysics” (now “The Bulletin of Mathematical Biology”), an important 
contribution to the field of theoretical biology. In this journal one finds most of Rashevsky’s 
published biological material, and it also served to introduce the work of many of his students. 
Thus, the journal helped to catapult new careers and (above all) catalyze the formation and 
maintenance of the “mathematical biophysics” school, still an influential school in modern 
theoretical biology (Rosen, 1991). To be fair, the journal was widely open to all interested 
researchers. More than that, Rashevsky and his colleague Herb Landahl used to take for 
themselves the task of correcting and even helping to extend the mathematics, encouraging the 
authors to re-submit the papers. As a side note, it is interesting to mention that, given the 
shortcomings of the publication of graphics at the time, Landahl offered invaluable help to the 
authors, carefully preparing each drawing for printing (Cull, 2007). 
The importance of organizing new journals, proceedings and books for “legitimating” a new 
branch of science was emphasized by Smocovitis (1996). I would like to suggest, therefore, that 
the “mathematical biophysics” case fits nicely this interpretation. Other periodicals of 
importance that arose during this period include “Acta Biotheoretica,” founded in 1935 by the 
group then at the Professor Jan der Hoeven Foundation for Theoretical Biology of the University 
of Leiden, “Bibliographia Biotheoretica” (published by the same group) and the well-known 
“Journal of Theoretical Biology,” founded in 1961 (Morowitz, 1965).  
Rashevsky is rightly acknowledged for the proposition of a systematic approach to the use 
of mathematical methods in biology. He intended to develop a “mathematical biology” that 
would relate to experiments just like the well-established mathematical physics (Cull, 2007). He 
chose to name this new field of inquiry “mathematical biophysics,” a decision reflected in the 
title of the aforementioned journal. By the mid-1930s Rashevsky had already explored the links 
between chemical reactions and physical diffusion (currently known as “reaction-diffusion” 
phenomena), as well as the associated destabilization of homogeneous states that is at the core of 
the modern notion of self-organization (Rosen, 1991). An elaborated theory of cell division 
based on the principles behind diffusion drag forces was offered close to the end of that decade 
(Rashevsky, 1939), and led to new equations concerning the rates of constriction and elongation 
of demembranated Arbacia eggs under division (Landahl, 1942a, 1942b). (I note that Arbacia is 
a genus of hemispherically-shaped sea urchins commonly used in experiments of the kind.) This 
theory agreed well with previously available empirical data, but Rashevsky himself urged to 
demonstrate that the theory of diffusion drag forces was inadequate to represent most other facts 
of cell division known at the time (Rosen, 1991). 
 Rashevsky’s major work is (rather unsurprisingly) entitled “Mathematical Biophysics” 
(Rashevsky, 1960), a book that was revised and reedited more than once (most of the above 
mentioned studies can be found in this publication). The original edition, dating back to 1938, 
covered cellular biophysics, excitation phenomena and the central nervous system, with 
emphasis in the physical representation (Morowitz, 1965). Subsequently, Rashevsky delved into 
still more abstract mathematical approaches, as I describe later.  
I wish to point out that the initial efforts of Rashevsky are both important and largely 
unrecognized by contemporary philosophers and historians of science. Indeed, the academic 
infrastructure and the research agenda established by this forerunner were crucial in subsidizing 
the development of important scientific contributions made by other researchers. Perhaps the 
most unexpected case is the crucial role played by Rashevsky in the line of investigation leading 
to the celebrated McCulloch-Pitts model of neural networks, published in 1943. Consider the 
following statement, which nicely summarizes a commonly held belief of the scientific and 
philosophical communities: “The neural nets branch of AI began with a very early paper by 
Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts...” (Franklin, forthcoming). Actually, the first mathematical 
descriptions of the behavior of “nerves” and networks of nerves are to be credited to Rashevsky, 
who during the early 1930´s published several papers concerning a mathematical theory of 
conduction in nerves, based on electrochemical gradients and the diffusion of substances 
(Abraham, 2002). Rashevsky´s fundamental idea was to use two linear differential equations 
together with a nonlinear threshold operator (Rashevsky, 1933). It was in this paper, hence, that 
Rashevsky´s “two-factor” theory of nerve excitation became public for the first time. This theory 
was based on the diffusion kinetics of excitors and inhibitors (Abraham, 2002). Only many years 
later the unknown “substances” were correctly identified as concentrations of sodium and 
potassium, thanks to the important work of Hodgkin and Huxley (Cull, 2007). I am not willing to 
get into the technical details here (a thorough investigation will be published elsewhere), but 
suffice it to say that Rashevsky argued that his simple mathematical model could fit empirical 
data, available at the time, regarding the behavior of single neurons. Still more important, he 
postulated that these model neurons could be connected in networks, in order to yield complex 
behavior, and even allow the modeling of the entire human brain (Cull, 2007). Latter, close to 
the end of that decade, Walter Pitts was introduced to Rashevsky by Rudolf Carnap, and 
accepted into his mathematical biology group (Cowan, 1998). Together, Pitts (who was a superb 
mathematician) and the “philosophical psychiatrist” Warren S. McCulloch (Abraham, 2002) 
published their groundbreaking paper, entitled “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in 
Nervous Activity” (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943). Many years later, McCulloch recalled that he 
and Pitts were able to publish their ideas in Rashevsky´s journal thanks to Rashevsky´s defense 
of mathematical and logical ideas in the field of biology (Abraham, 2002). The objective fact 
that Rashevsky was apparently the first investigator to come up with the idea of a “neural net” 
mathematical model (Rosen, 1991), however, was largely neglected. 
According to Rosen (1991), by the 1950s Rashevsky had explored many areas of theoretical 
biology, but he felt that his approach still lacked “genuinely fresh insights.” Thus, he suddenly 
took a wholly new research direction, turning from mathematical methods closely associated 
with empirical data to an overarching search for general biological principles. Putting aside 
Rosen´s opinion, this radical turn is seemingly most easily justifiable simply as a strong reaction 
to Rashevsky´s own critics, who claimed that his mathematical biophysics approach was not a 
novelty anymore (ironically) –, given that many researchers had already began incorporating 
models derived from physics, as well as quantitative methods, in their work (Cull, 2007). 
Anyway, the fact is that Rashevsky expressed a bunch of novel ideas in a paper interestingly 
entitled “Topology and Life: In Search of General Mathematical Principles in Biology and 
Sociology”. In the paper, after pointing out most major developments in the mathematical 
biology of the time, he goes on saying: “All [these] theories ... deal with separate biological 
phenomena. There is no record of a successful mathematical theory which would treat the 
integrated activities of the organism as a whole.” (Rashevsky, 1954, p. 319-320). According to 
him, it was important to have the knowledge that diffusion drag forces are responsible for cell 
division and that pressure waves are reflected in blood vessels, as well as to have a mathematical 
formalism for dealing with complicated neural networks. But then he emphasized that there was 
nothing so far in these theories indicating that an adequate functioning of the circulatory system 
was fundamental for the normal operation of intracellular processes; Furthermore, there was 
nothing in the formalisms showing that an elaborated process in the brain, that resulted, e.g., in 
the location of food, was causally connected with metabolic processes going on in the cells of the 
digestive system. The same was true regarding the causal nexus between a failure in the normal 
behavior of a network of neurons and the cell divisions that resulted from a stimulation of the 
process of healing due to the accidental cutting of, say, a thumb (Rosen, 1991). And yet, 
according to him, “this integrated activity of the organism is probably the most essential 
manifestation of life.” (Rashevsky, 1954, p. 320). Unfortunately, Rashevsky argued, one usually 
approaches the effects of these diffusion drag forces simply as a diffusion problem in a 
specialized physical system, and one deals with the processes of circulation simply as special 
hydrodynamic problems. Hence, the “fundamental manifestations of life” are definitely excluded 
from all those biomathematical theories. In other words, biomathematics, according to 
Rashevsky, lacked a capacity to adequately describe true integration of the parts of any organic 
system. As a result, it was useless to try to apply the physical principles, used in the aforesaid 
mechanical models of biological phenomena, to develop a comprehensive theory of life. Similar 
lines of criticism could be applied, I submit, to modern theoretical frameworks attempting to 
provide integrated models of the living organism (or the brain itself). This line of thought was 
further developed by Rashevsky´s student Robert Rosen, who yielded an interesting theoretical 
framework, built around a special notion of complexity. He also promoted the use of new 
mathematical tools, like category theory, in theoretical biology investigations (Rosen, 1991, 
2000). 
According to Rashevsky, putting aside the possibility of constructing a physicomathematical 
theory of the organism based on the physicochemical dynamics of cells and of cellular 
aggregates does not prevent one from trying to find alternative pathways. What are the 
possibilities, then? The key to understanding Rashevsky’s perspective, I suggest, is to start 
analyzing some of his fundamental premises. In fact, Rashevsky used to believe that the 
biomathematics of his time was in a pre-Newtonian stage of development, despite the elaborate 
theories then available. In pre-Newtonian physics there existed simple mathematical treatments 
of isolated phenomena, but it was only with the arrival of Newton´s principles, incorporated in 
his laws of motion, that physics attained a more comprehensive and unified synthesis. Ordinary 
models of biomathematics, like the models of theoretical physics, are all based in physical 
principles. But Rashevsky seemed to suggest that they should instead be based on genuinely 
biological principles, in order to capture the integrated activities of the organism as a whole 
(Rosen, 1991). This is apparent in his words: “We must look for a principle which connects the 
different physical phenomena involved and expresses the biological unity of the organism and of 
the organic world as a whole.” (Rashevsky, 1954, p. 321, italics added). He also argued that 
mathematical models are transient in nature, while a general principle, when discovered, is 
perennial. For example, it is possible to devise several alternative models, all obeying the laws of 
Newton (one model being e.g. the “billiard ball” molecule of the kinetic theory of gases). On the 
same guise, there are distinct cosmological models, all based upon Einstein’s fundamental 
principles (Peacock, 1999; Dalarsson and Dalarsson, 2005). It is clear then that Rashevsky 
wished to conceive general principles, in biology, enjoying the same status earned by principles 
in theoretical physics. After all, he was trained as a theoretical physicist. 
 
 
  
3. Looking for general biological principles 
 
I already highlighted the fact that Rashevsky was a researcher that eagerly pursued general 
biological principles, and he indeed explicitly managed to propose some. In what follows, I 
briefly examine (following Rosen, 1991) the nature of some of these principles. The first 
principle I would like to emphasize is Rashevsky’s principle of adequate design of organisms, 
originally denominated principle of maximum simplicity, and introduced as early as in 1943. As 
originally formulated it states that, given that the same biological functions can be performed by 
different structures, the particular structure found in nature is the simplest one compatible with 
the performance of a function or set of functions. The principle of maximum simplicity applies 
therefore to different models of mechanisms, of which the simplest one is to be preferred. But 
given that simplicity is a vague notion in this case, being difficult to find out a measurement 
standard, Rashevsky self-critically turned to a slightly different version, denominated principle 
of optimal design. In this case, it is required that a structure necessary for performing a given 
function be optimal relatively to energy and material needs. But it can be argued that there is still 
some imprecision here, because a structure that is optimal with respect to material needs is not 
necessarily optimal as far as energy expenditures are concerned. Hence, a more straightforward 
notion was in need. Accordingly, Rashevsky turned to the last formulation of his principle, this 
time putting aside the notion of optimality:  
 
When a set of functions of an organism or of a single organ is prescribed, then, in order to 
find the shape and structure of the organ, the mathematical biologist must proceed just as an 
engineer proceeds in designing a structure or a machine for the performance of a given 
function. The design must be adequate to the performance of the prescribed function under 
specified varying environmental conditions. This may be called the principle of adequate 
design of the organism. (Rashevsky, 1965, p. 41, italics added).  
 
I note that the notion of “adequate” is still also a bit vague, but I am not pursuing this 
discussion further in this paper. Let me instead raise a more interesting question, which 
repeatedly arises in philosophy of biology, particularly in those areas of inquiry closely 
associated to the Darwinian theory of biological evolution: Is Rashevsky´s principle of adequate 
design of the organism teleological? To this objection Rashevsky himself had an answer: all 
variational principles in physics are “teleological” or “goal-directed,” beginning with the 
principle of least action (see Lanczos, 1970, for a detailed mathematical account of this and other 
physical principles). Other investigators subsequently offered similar justifications, e.g. Robert 
Rosen, who dedicated a full chapter of his book “Essays on Life Itself” (Rosen, 2000), entitled 
“Optimality in Biology and Medicine”, to this technical discussion.  Another objection that 
Rashevsky was well aware of was that the principle of adequate “design” seemed to imply some 
sort of creative intelligence. Must one, in this case, presuppose a “universal engineer” of sorts? 
Not necessarily, because, like most scientific principles, the principle of adequate design of the 
organism “offers us merely an operational prescription for the determination of organic form by 
calculation.” (Rashevsky, 1965, p. 45). Here, I suggest that one would perhaps do best simply 
not employing the term “design,” that also seems to be rather misguiding in this context. On the 
other hand, according to Rashevsky, the principle could perhaps follow directly from the 
operation of natural selection, which would only preserve “adequate” organisms, although it 
could turn out to be an independent principle. This too, I suggest, could be nourishment for 
heated discussions among contemporary philosophers of biology. 
Perhaps still more thought-provoking is Rashevsky´s “principle of biological epimorphism,” 
that emphasizes qualitative relations as opposed to quantitative aspects, topology instead of 
metrics. It can be argued that a given biological property in a higher organism has many more 
elementary processes than the equivalent biological property of a lower one. Examples of 
biological properties are perception, locomotion, metabolism, etc. The principle is based upon 
the fact that different organisms can be epimorphically mapped onto each other, after the 
biological properties were already clearly distinguished and represented. In such epimorphic 
mappings, the basic relations characterizing the organism as a whole are preserved. Given 
Rashevsky’s mathematical proclivities, he wanted to put his principle into a precise and rational 
context. Among the several branches of relational mathematics, topology reigns supreme. Before 
going on, I think it necessary to briefly digress about this topic.  
It is a known fact that topological ideas are present in most branches of modern 
mathematics. In a nutshell, topology is the mathematical study of properties of objects, which are 
preserved through deformation, stretching and twisting (tearing is forbidden). Hence, one is 
entitled to say that a circle is topologically equivalent to an ellipse, given that one can be 
transformed into the other by stretching. The same is valid for a sphere, which can be 
transformed into an ellipsoid, and vice versa. Topology has indeed to do with the study of 
objects like curves, surfaces, the space-time of Minkowsky (in relativity theory, see Peacock, 
1999), physical phase spaces and so on. Furthermore, the objects of topology can be formally 
defined as “topological spaces.” Two such objects are homeomorphic if they have the same 
topological properties. Using such perspective, Rashevsky postulated that to each organism there 
is a corresponding topological “complex.” More complicated complexes correspond to higher 
organisms, and different complexes are converted into each other by means of a universal rule of 
geometrical transformation. Furthermore, they can be mapped onto each other in a many-to-one 
manner, preserving certain basic relations. Rashevsky expressed his “principle of biological 
epimorphism” by postulating that, if one represents geometrically the relations between several 
functions of an organism in a single convenient topological complex, then the topological 
complexes that represent different organisms are obtainable, via a proper transformation, from 
just one or a few primordial topological complexes. A previous version of this principle is what 
Rashevsky used to call the “principle of bio-topological mapping.” According to this principle, 
the topological complexes by means of which diverse organisms are represented are all 
obtainable from one or a few primordial complexes by the same transformation. This 
transformation contains one or more parameters, different values of it corresponding to different 
organisms (Rashevsky, 1954). The considerations above may hopefully give us a glimpse of 
Rashevsky’s relational approach to the study of life, epitomized in the expression “relational 
biology,” that he coined in order to help delineate a clear framework for thinking in the life 
sciences.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Nicolas Rashevsky (who passed away in 1972) was a pioneer in theoretical biology, having 
inaugurated the school of “mathematical biophysics” and subsequently pioneered the field of 
“relational biology” or (still another term that he coined) “biotopology.” I call attention to the 
fact that the latter must definitely be distinguished from “topobiology,” a term coined by Nobel 
laureate Gerald Edelman in the context of cell and embryonic development research. Edelman´s 
theory postulates that differential adhesive interactions among heterogeneous cell populations 
drive morphogenesis, and explains, among other things, how a complex multi-cellular organism 
can arise from a single cell (Edelman, 1988).  
I already emphasized that the creation of “The Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics” was an 
important tool for establishing and helping broadcast Rashevsky´s work (as well as the proposals 
of his own students). Furthermore, I pointed out that the work of Rashevsky implies that at least 
some aspects of contemporary theoretical biology and neuroscience have older roots than 
previously thought. This is exemplified by Rashevsky´s active role in the body of research that 
paved the way to the development and publication of the McCulloch-Pitts model of neural 
networks. Finally, I suggested that Rashevsky´s criticism of purely mechanical and non-
integrative approaches to biology may as well be evaluated under the light of current theories, 
including proposals in theoretical biology – and, once again, in neuroscience. The critical 
analysis of these claims, I submit, is an interesting and yet largely unexplored subject-matter to 
philosophers of science. 
Rashevsky´s influence still reverberates in important scientific research areas such as neural 
networks and non-equilibrium pattern formation, among others. However, as I see it, relational 
biology effectively came of age with the far more encompassing and methodical work of 
Rashevsky’s former student Robert Rosen (who passed away in 1998 – see Rosen 1991, 2000) 
and of his followers. A very active contemporary player worth mentioning is a bright pupil of 
Rosen, the mathematical biologist Aloisius H. Louie (see Louie, 2009, 2013). 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
Some ideas presented in this paper first came to my mind during the development of my Ph.D. 
dissertation, years ago, and ended up as part of a chapter (still unpublished). Accordingly, I 
would like to thank CNPq for the support at the time, by means of a much needed research grant. 
 
References 
 
ABRAHAM, T. H. (Physio)logical circuits: The intellectual origins of the McCulloch-Pitts 
neural networks. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, v. 38, p. 3-25, 2002. 
 
COWAN, J. D. Interview with J. A. Anderson and E. Rosenfeld. In: Anderson, J. A.; Rosenfeld, 
E. (Eds.), Talking nets: An oral history of neural networks. Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998. 
Pp. 97-124. 
 
CULL, P. The mathematical biophysics of Nicolas Rashevsky. BioSystems, v. 88, p. 178-184, 
2007. 
 
DALARSSON, M., DALARSSON, N. Tensors, relativity and cosmology. New York: Elsevier, 
2005. 
 
EDELMAN, G. M. Topobiology: An introduction to molecular embriology. New York: Basic 
Books, 1988. 
 
FISHER, R. A. The genetical theory of natural selection. Oxford: Clarendon, 1930. 
 
FISHER, R. A. The theory of inbreeding. London: Oliver and Boyd, 1949. 
 
HALDANE, J. B. S. A mathematical theory of natural and artificial selection. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1924. 
 
HINSHELWOOD, C. N. The chemical kinetics of the bacterial cell. Oxford: Clarendon, 1946. 
 
KOSTITZIN, V. A. Biologie mathématique. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1937. 
 
LANDAHL, H. D. A kinetic theory of diffusion forces in metabolizing systems. Bulletin of 
Mathematical Biophysics, v. 4, p. 15-26, 1942a. 
 
LANDAHL, H. D. A mathematical analysis of elongation and constriction in cell division. 
Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, v. 4, p 45-62, 1942b. 
 
LANCZOS, C. The variational principles of mechanics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1970.  
 
LOTKA, A. J. Elements of physical biology. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1925. 
 
LOUIE, A. H. More than life itself: A synthetic continuation in relational biology. Frankfurt: 
Ontos-Verlag, 2009. 
 
LOUIE, A. H. The reflection of life: Functional entailment and imminence in relational biology. 
New York: Springer, 2013. 
 
McCULLOCH, W. S., PITTS, W. A logical calculus of the ideas immanent in nervous activity. 
Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, v. 5, p. 115-133, 1943. 
 
MOROWITZ, H. J. The historical background. In: Waterman, T. H.; Morowitz, H. J. (Eds.),  
Theoretical and mathematical biology. New York: Blaisdell, 1965. pp. 24-35.  
 
ODUM, H. T. Systems ecology: An introduction. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983. 
 
PEACOCK, J. A. Cosmological physics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
RASHEVSKY, N. Outline of a physico-mathematical theory of excitation and inhibition. 
Protoplasma, v.20, 1933. 
 
RASHEVSKY, N. The mechanism of cell division. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, v.1, p. 
23-30, 1939. 
 
RASHEVSKY, N. Topology and life: In search of general mathematical principles in biology 
and sociology. Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, v.16, p. 317-348, 1954. 
 
RASHEVSKY, N.  Mathematical Biophysics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960. 
 
RASHEVSKY, N. Models and mathematical principles in biology. In: Waterman, T. H.; 
Morowitz, H. J. Theoretical and mathematical biology. New York: Blaisdell, 1965. p. 36-53. 
 
ROSEN, R. Life itself: A comprehensive inquiry into the nature, origin and foundation of life. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1991. 
 
ROSEN, R. Essays on life itself. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.  
 
SHANNON, C. E. A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System Technical Journal, 
v.27, p. 379-423, 1948. 
 
SCHRÖDINGER, E. What is life? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1944.  
 
SMOCOVITIS, V. B. Unifying biology: The evolutionary synthesis and evolutionary biology. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. 
 
FRANKLIN, S. History, motivations, and core themes. In: Frankish, K.; Ramsey, W. M. (Eds.), 
The Cambridge handbook of artificial intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming. 
 
THOMPSON, D’A. W. On growth and form. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917. 
 
ULANOWICZ, R. E. An hypothesis on the development of natural communities. Journal of 
Theoretical Biology, v. 85, p. 223-245, 1980.  
 
ULANOWICZ, R. E. Ecology, the ascendent perspective. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1997. 
 
VOLTERRA, V. Leçons sur la théorie mathématique de la lutte pour la vie. Paris: Gauthier-
Villars, 1931. 
 
WIENER, N. Cybernetics. New York: MIT Press, 1948. 
